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Abstract 
This research article considers a simulated scenario in which there exists policy infrastructure that 
promotes employment options to support desirable life after retirement with fiscal sustainability. Two 
proposed “demo” policy tools, among many others, include (1) legislative flexibility in employment and 
(2) tax incentives for employers. These measures aim at encouraging employment structure with working 
conditions favorable for elderly workers. The results of the simulation imply that, given suitable working 
conditions, a minimum of 50% of the potential elderly workforce participating in the market can yield 
marginal annual income of approximately 44,268 - 165,295 Baht per elderly worker and approximately 
4.74 - 9.35% GDP increase from the baseline GDP growth with ageing population structure. Moreover, 
the estimated possible minimum marginal net tax revenue is approximately 33,279- 65,994 million Baht. 
This marginal government revenue, if allocated to old-age expenditure, amounts to approximately 4,000 
Baht per elderly per year. The proposed scenario with policy infrastructure that encourages elderly labor 
participation in the economy constitutes a self-funded model with fiscal sustainability and represents a 
win-win scenario. Nevertheless, the success of implementing such policy tools depends on the 
understanding, co-operation and synchronization among the Thai public institutions as well as all parts of 
the society. 
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1. Introduction 
The question that sparks this research paper relates to how Thailand’s ageing society can be 
structured to become a desirable one. In the first instance, a desirable ageing society that one can 
imagine can be a society in which both the elderly and working population are happy, and there 
is fiscal sustainability to support their living at least at the subsistence level. Nevertheless, the 
value of subsistence level varies considerably from person to person; ranging from a level of 
“just enough” at 5,000 baht per month (Tankulrat, 2015a)2 and 6,000 baht per month 
(Hempornwisan and Akarachanon, 2014) for the Thai formal labor force to a “sufficient” level at 
16,000 baht per month for Thai civil servants (Tankulrat, 2015b)3.  
 With that said, what can be done particularly to enable the elderly access this desirable 
condition? Based on literature in the past, a body of research tries to examine the trend, 
sustainability and management of the pension funds, the old age funds, and the other forms of 
old age allowances, which pressed for the need to increase saving for retirement at national as 
well as local levels. Other studies analyzed the extension of working tenure under the existing 
structure of society, culture and law. The recommendations from both groups of research are 
restricted to specific context in practice. As for the first group, policy implications encounter 
limitations regarding budget constraint and fiscal space. It is widely accepted that with limited 
budget and other governmental expenditures that lack flexibility, it is difficult to achieve 
efficient distribution of sufficient amount of money or create a desirable condition for the 
elderly. For the second group, extension of working tenure (or retirement age) in such a way that 
“requires completion of task unto one’s last breath” may be excruciatingly brutal. This also faces 
                                                 
2 The article refers to the research “Adequate Minimum Lump sum for retirement”, Chulalongkorn University 
3 The article refers to the study by Thailand’s Government Pension Fund. 
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limitations, at least, pertaining to the physical aspect of old age that requires them to continue 
with their usual task which do not seem to be beneficial for the physical and mental wellbeing of 
the elderly in the case that it is mandatory for them to work in the same quantity as their younger 
colleagues.  Such stress and time constraint lacks the flexibility for living a desirable elderly life. 
  As of now, Thai society still lacks policy infrastructure to create an old-age employment 
option to support a desirable life after retirement, which encourages elderly of all backgrounds 
and education level to maintain “vigor” in the organization and at the same time, gives them 
flexibility in living their lives as an elderly. The example of such flexibility includes scheme that 
requires old age labor to work fewer days per week with work condition that is suitable with 
their age. As Serge Volkoff, a statistician and ergonomist4 at Centre d’etudes de l’emploi in 
France, suggested that sustainable work over the life course5 need to have 3 main characteristics 
namely; (1) the work should be suitable with human’s bodily caliber and adjust with life’s 
timeline (bio-compatible), (2) the work should encourage development of efficiency that 
determines working strategy (ergo-compatible) and (3) the work should strengthen balance 
between working, personal and familial life (socio-compatible) (Fric, 2014). In addition, the by-
products are “pocket money” in addition to the existing saving and old-age pension provided by 
government, sense of dignity that they are valuable to society, physical and mental wellbeing as 
they are required to exert an appropriate level of workload and increased social activity which 
prevents depression. 
 This article presents a simulation analysis with concrete policy implications to offer Thai 
society with alternatives to promote a desirable life after retirement. It is also crucial for all 
                                                 
4 Ergonomics is derived from Greek “ergon” meaning work and “nomos” meaning natural laws, which when 
combined may be interpreted as law of work. This is a science concerning with adjustment of work conditions to 
suit the undertaker or a systematic adjustment of work conditions. 
5 Life course here implies increase in one’s age or simply retirement. 
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concerned parties to understand different policy choices and their mechanisms in order to create 
an appropriate employment scheme that is both suitable and beneficial for the physical and 
mental wellbeing of aged population. This research employs scenario analyzes by using two 
government’s “demo” policy tools namely; (1) labor laws and (2) tax incentives to stimulate 
appropriate employment scheme for the potential population aged 60-79 years, while 
maintaining the existing level of old age benefits provided by the government. The scope of this 
research includes analysis of economic growth, income of the elderly labor force and tax revenue 
accrued to the government based on Thailand’s demographic forecast in 2010 by Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) under medium-variant scenario. 
Economic parameters in the simulation are set as in the real situation, which varies according to 
the demographic conditions and average trends in the past. It is important to note that this 
simulation analysis does not include other social transfers, the macroeconomic multiplier effects 
that might occur in Thailand, and the effect of new taxes to be levied in the future. 
 The rest of this article is structured as follow; section 2 discusses statistical information 
and the conditions of Thai ageing society. Section 3 reviews related literature pertaining to the 
management of ageing society. Section 4 outlines the conceptual framework, methodology and 
scope of the research. Section 5 discusses the estimates from the simulation scenarios in which 
government tools are used to induce employment scheme for the potential elderly population 
aged 60-79 years. Section 6 concludes empirical evidence supporting policy implications that 
open up choices for the implementation of old age employment scheme for a better quality of life 
after retirement. 
2. Statistical information and conditions of Thai ageing society 
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 This section discusses specific characteristics and working conditions of the elderly 
population in Thailand with the aim of supporting the implementation of alternative measures for 
the employment scheme to be discussed in Section 4. As for the overview, the data from NESDB 
indicates that population aged over 60 years is on an increasing trend in a significant way; from 
11.9% of total population in 2010 to 25.2% in 2030. In other words, one-fourth of total 
population will be aged population. The main reason for this phenomenon owes to the reduction 
in fertility rate below a replacement level. At present, it is estimated that on average one woman 
of childbearing age gives birth to around 1.6 children in her whole life cycle, compared to a rate 
of 4.9 children 40 years ago. In addition, there is a tendency for the population to live longer. 
Life expectancy for Thai population has increased continuously and in the next 30 years, it is 
estimated that life expectancy for male and female will increase to 75.3 and 81.9 years, from the 
present levels of 71.6 and 78.4 years respectively. 
 If we specifically examine the demographic structure of Thai aged population, survey 
report of the older persons in Thailand in 2007 by the National Statistical Office points out that 
around 34.13% of aged population have an average monthly income of 1,250 Baht or lower, 
which is below a poverty line in 2007, set at 1,443 Baht per head per month. 83.51% of the aged 
population have an average monthly income of 6,250 Baht or lower, which is close to the 
sufficient level of 6,000 Baht per person per month. (Hempornwisan and Akarachanon, 2014).  
 Regarding sufficiency, 42% reported that their income is sufficient at times or 
insufficient. Table 1 reflects the fact that major portion of income for the elderly come from their 
children (which is in line with Chawla (2008) and United Nations (2013)) and working. A minor 
portion comes from pension and old age allowances. However, based on the reduction in 
potential old-age support ratio, which is the number of population aged 15-59 years to the 
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number of aged population, from 5.08 in 2010 to 4.15 in 2015, together with the population 
estimate by Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the potential old-
age support ratio in 2040 will be reduced to 1.71. Hence, the role of income from children as 
seen in the past will become subdued. Nevertheless, the role of old age allowance is becoming 
more significant. With no policy restructuring that corresponds with the fiscal conditions, these 
support measures will encounter limitations imposed by budget constraint. 
Table 1. Sources of income for Thai aged population (% of total aged population) 
Sources of income 2007 2011 2014 
Working 28.86% 35.10% 33.80% 
Pension 4.36% 6.00% 4.80% 
Old age allowance 2.79% 11.40% 14.90% 
Interest 2.87% 2.60% 3.80% 
Spouse 6.09% 3.10% 4.30% 
Children 52.27% 40.10% 36.80% 
Relatives 2.26% 1.50% 1.40% 
 Others 0.50% 0.20% 0.20% 
Source: The survey of the older persons in Thailand 2007, The National Statistical Office, Thailand; 
analysis for 2011 and 2014 from Suwanrada (2015) who referred to Knodel et al. (2013) and Knodel et al. 
(2015). 
 
 As for the working condition for Thai elderly, 2,636,083 elderly workers or 37.55% of 
total aged population want to work but only 2,509,444 persons or 35.74% of the total aged 
population are employed. Two main reasons for working owe to the need to earn income for 
family or personal consumption (56.81%) and maintain good health condition or employability 
at old age (30.72%). For those who are not working, two main reasons owe to agedness (55.51%) 
and the need to look after home or family (17.80%). If we consider the physical aspect of the 
elderly, Table 2 indicates that on average more than 76% of aged people evaluate their health 
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status as moderate to good condition and Table 3 indicates that on average, most elders can see 
(78%) and hear (85%) clearly. Hence, if we consider the net potential elderly workforce in 
Thailand, excluding those who are disabled and in long-term care as estimated in Prasitsiriphon 
et al. (2013), it can be said that this group of workforce has the potential in driving the economy 
and relieve fiscal constraints in the future. 
Table 2. Self-evaluation of health status by the elderly, distributed in age groups. 
Health status  Total 
60-69 
years 
70-79 
years 
80 years 
and 
above 
Good to moderate 75.65% 81.44% 70.05% 58.58% 
Bad 24.20% 18.35% 29.88% 41.35% 
Cannot evaluate 0.15% 0.21% 0.07% 0.07% 
Source: The survey of the older persons in Thailand, 2007, The National Statistical Office, Thailand 
 
Table 3. Ability to see and hear among the elderly, distributed in age groups 
  Total 
60-69 
years 
70-79 
years 
80 years 
and 
above 
Seeing         
Clear without the use of spectacles 
or lenses  53.57% 60.52% 46.68% 33.60% 
Clear with the use of spectacles or 
lenses 25.34% 26.25% 25.07% 20.69% 
Not clear - cannot see 20.89% 13.01% 28.04% 45.66% 
Cannot evaluate 0.20% 0.22% 0.21% 0.05% 
Hearing         
Clear without the use of hearing aid 84.20% 91.48% 78.91% 56.94% 
Clear with the use of hearing aid 1.19% 1.07% 1.33% 1.46% 
Not clear - cannot hear 14.42% 7.26% 19.57% 41.39% 
Cannot evaluate 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.21% 
Source: The survey of the older persons in Thailand, 2007, The National Statistical Office, Thailand 
 
 With regards to working status of the working elderly, 63.19% operate business on their 
own without employee while 17.22% and 12.74% assist in household enterprise with no 
compensation and work for private company, respectively. Such employment structure suggests 
that people who are willing to work after the age of 60 have limited job opportunities, and 
thereby are compelled to conduct own business. This is in line with the case of self-employment 
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due to “necessity” as seen in many other countries because they cannot continue their tenure in 
formal organization despite the desire to do so (Block and Koellinger, 2009). Moreover, 
investment of lifetime saving in business while lacking expertise further exposes old-age people 
to higher level of financial risk. Kilenthong and Rueanthip (2015) observed one fact from 
Thailand’s Socio-Economic Survey (SES) data during 2005-2012 which indicates that around 
78% of business startups by entrepreneurs aged over 50 years are more likely to shut down 
within 6 years and this particular group who shuts down their business chooses to exit from the 
labor force altogether. Thus, policy restructuring, that creates more job opportunities for elderly 
workers so that they have alternatives to work in formal organizations (with a more flexible 
workload compared to young workers) instead of bearing risk from personal investment, can 
create financial flexibility for them to a great extent. 
 Furthermore, if we closely examine the “quality of life” from working or the working 
condition for Thai seniors based on work hours, Table 4 shows the average number of work 
hours per week for Thai labor by age group, indicating that active workers in 60-69 years, on 
average, work for 42 hours per week. In other words, if they work for 8 hours a day, it implies 
that they need to work 5 hours a week which requires them to live life the same way as they do 
during their working life. As for labor aged 70-79 years and above 80 years, the number of work 
hours decreased marginally to 40 and 38 hours per week respectively. However, the inflexibility 
in the reduction of work hours is significant when compared to the number of work hours for old 
age workers in other countries like UK (See Table 5). It can be observed that the actual work 
hours per week for old age workers in UK is between 17-33 hours which is significantly lower 
when compared to that of Thailand. Nevertheless, from the survey on desired number of work 
hours for old age workers in UK, it was found that senior workers still have the desire to reduce 
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the number of work hours to around 7-21 hours per week. Put it differently, if they work for 7-8 
hours a day, they will be working for 2-3 days a week, which would allow them to live life with 
more flexibility while giving them social space in organization with better physical and mental 
health. This is in line with the research by Wivatvanit et al. (2008) who found that when old age 
people engage in activities for supplementary income, they gain more pleasure from having 
friends of their own age, supporting each other through hard times which make them feel 
valuable and stay healthy. 
Table 4. Number of working hours per week for Thai labor, by age group 
Age group 
Average number of working hours per 
week 
15-50 45.24 
51-59 43.89 
60-69 42.07 
70-79 39.52 
80+ 37.83 
Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013, The National Statistical Office, Thailand and processed by researcher 
 
Table 5. Number of actual working hours per week and number of desired working hours per week of 
labor force in UK, by age group and working status 
  
Number of 
actual working hours 
Number of 
desired working hours 
Age group Employee Employer Employee Employer 
50-64 31.60 32.80 20.90 19.30 
65-69 22.00 22.80 10.70 8.90 
70+ 17.20 19.50 6.90 8.40 
Source: Bell and Rutherford (2013) Table 3 and Table 5b, processed from UK Labor Force Survey, 2012 
and summarized tabulation by the author 
 
3. Literature review: Management of ageing society and policy guidelines in Thailand 
 In the past, Thailand prepared the 1st National Plan on the Elderly (1982-2001) and the 
2nd National Plan (2001-2021), based on the following basic principles namely; (1) creation of 
security for the elderly, which in turn creates stability for the society, (2) elders are valued, have 
potential and should be encouraged to contribute to the society, (3) elders have dignity and are 
capable of living in their own community in an appropriate manner as their age requires, and (4) 
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most elders are not people who lack opportunities or are burden to the society despite the fact 
that some elderly encounter hardship and need support from society and government for certain 
period of old-age life (National Board of Promotion and Coordination for the Elderly, 2002).  
On account of the preparation of the 2nd National Plan on the Elderly, Jitapunkul and 
Wivatvanit (2009) observed that the 2nd plan has more impact on society compared to the first 
because of two main reasons. The first reason is that pushing for the inclusion of old age issue in 
the constitution creates strong mobilization through political process. The second reason is the 
response to the request of United Nations in realizing the transition to a society with rising 
number of old people, which is how the current trend at the international level is used to increase 
additional awareness at a domestic level. These research suggested creation of an indicator which 
can be used by Thailand and, at the same time, other countries can learn from Thailand’s 
experience in choosing the model and management strategy for ageing society in the future. 
Suwanrada (2015), who cited the result of evaluation plan by Prajuabmoh et al. (2009), found 
that Thailand’s preparation for ageing society in accordance with the strategy to create quality 
old age population together with the creation of social security system for the elderly has not yet 
fulfilled the objective set by the indicator. Nevertheless, in the past 5 years, welfare for the 
elderly has been continuously mobilized through policy at national level. One example is the 
promotion of saving for old age by the National Saving Fund Act B.E. 2554, which officially 
came into force on 20th August 2015 (Suwanrada, 2015).  
The fact that Thai society is transiting to an ageing one together with problems regarding 
income structure, opportunities, distribution and saving that have long plagued majority of old 
age population in the country who still lack subsistence for expenditure at old age has created 
widespread concerns as old-age dependency ratio has risen. As of now, population estimate by 
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NESDB indicates the ratio to be around 1:4 with tendency to rise further. This phenomenon has 
created fiscal pressure in the form of old age expenditure, which is increasing with the growing 
number of old people, and also tax revenue, which is expected to decrease on account of the 
reduction in taxable incomes and taxable consumption as economic growth tends to slow down 
with lower number of working population. 
 Literature in the past made effort to offer guidelines to the contemporary questions; 
where do we get the money from and how? (Who will pay? How will government get the 
money?) and how to manage and distribute welfare provision? (Who gets the benefit and how?). 
Based on how the questions are answered, past literature can be divided into 2 categories. The 
first emphasized on analyzing the source of finance and method to raise money to be used during 
old age in terms of efficiency, fiscal impacts and fiscal sustainability in the implementation of 
various policy alternatives by considering exogenous factors which only focus on inactive 
current elderly contributions. On the other hand, the second group of literature brought factors 
that include active current elderly contributions, which are endogenous factors within ageing 
population, into consideration. There have already been studies that examined the feasibility and 
appropriateness of old-age provisions, change perception about old people, extend age of 
retirement and provide job opportunities for the elderly at both national and regional level with 
the aim of generating additional income and complementing physical and mental health for old 
people who are still capable of working. This can be thought of as a way to augment old age 
welfare under the existing fiscal pressure.     
 In the first group of literature, many studies examined various relief schemes to assist the 
elderly through cooperation with other concerned agencies (Department of Local Administration, 
2005; Pukdeeamnut and Likitthammarot, 2014) and also the granting of basic rights for old 
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people in the name of humanity such as old age pension (Suwanrada, 2007), healthcare provision 
under the national health security for which Sakunpanit (2012) concluded that the fiscal situation 
for the country can still support the health security system. According to Sakunpanit (2012), if 
the society believes that the nation health security is in need, an increase in tax imposition and 
contribution to the national health security is a suitable fiscal restructuring that will offer 
accessible healthcare provision for all. In addition, there are studies that examined the 
restructuring and management of pension funds and fiscal sustainability under different systems. 
Phananiramai (2003) analyzed the development of Thailand’s national health security. 
Suwanrada (2015) estimated the overall fiscal burden for the government under different pension 
schemes that have been employed so far and concluded that in 2017, accumulated fiscal burden 
will be around 266,760 million Baht which will increase to around 473,439 million Baht in 2040 
(around 3.69% per annum on average). Moreover, there is also legal obligation in the form of 
subsidy that may arise in the case that the national health security is depleted. This is in line with 
the analysis by Phijaisanit (2011a) who estimated that the pension fund in the social security 
system is likely be used up in the year 2039.  
 On the other hand, the second group of literature which considered active current elderly 
contributions into account contributed to the modelling and appropriateness of old age 
employment promotion, development of skills among capable and quality seniors (See 
Phuangsaichai (2008); Soonthornchawakan and Cintakulchai (2009); Institute for Population and 
Social Research, Mahidol University. (2010); Sombat et al. (2011); Raksasub et al. (2010) for 
some examples). Growing number of old age population spawned new policy options that 
encourage the elderly to support themselves and live optimistically. Some examples are 
provision of assistive equipment, improvement in the environment and physical wellbeing of old 
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people so that they can move on their own and provision of flexible work hours, etc. (United 
Nations Population Fund, 2009;  Suwanrada and Chandoevwit, 2010).  
 Developing learning process to support ageing society in the long run is also another 
important aspect. A study by Advisory council on National Labor Development (2013) tried to 
point out that promotion of job opportunities for old people is to be considered by all concerned 
parties namely; employer, employee and the Ministry of Labor. Nevertheless, employment 
conditions, conditions related to benefits from national health security, potential of workforce 
and policies by government are factors that contribute to the success of creating job opportunities 
for the elderly. Thus, policy recommendations are to be classified according to potential and 
decision regarding various benefits. Moreover, Thailand Development Research Institute (2008) 
had once recommended that if the extension of retirement age from 60 to 65 years had been 
implemented in 2008, expenditure pertaining to pension fund would have been reduced by 
around 32 billion Baht in the period of 5 years. However, extension of retirement age under the 
existing work structure without structural reform to create employment options for old workers 
calls for further argument in the Thai society. 
 It can, however, be concluded that policy recommendations in both groups of literature 
are in line with those abroad. Change in the demographic structure caused many countries 
around the world to enter an ageing society with a low level of fertility rate and higher life 
expectancy which in turn caused them to face problems regarding insufficient budget and 
economic slowdown at a macro level. Many measures have been undertaken to increase fiscal 
stability; for instance, increased tax to generate more revenue for the government, reduction in 
budget that covers unnecessary expenses, public debt management by limiting the borrowing 
power within the predetermined public debt ceiling or long-term budget management. 
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Nevertheless, the change in demographic structure surrounding each country is surmounting and 
these measures, eventually, encounter with many practical limitations which further caused the 
budget to be insufficient to support all aged population in an appropriate manner. The fact that 
the number of ageing population is increasing indicates important policy implication that it is 
necessary to restructure the overall picture of welfare and undertake reforms concerning pension 
funds (Floden, 2001). Hence, in many countries like OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development), ageing and employment policies have been linked with the main 
objective of encouraging “greater labor market participation at an older age” through promoting 
job opportunities and increased flexibility in terms of employment (OECD, 2006; Sonnet et al., 
2014). 
 In the past decade, many countries have implemented policies to extend employment 
tenure and to encourage old workers to continue their tenure. Eichhorst (2011) found that 
Germany is the country that has succeeded in employing old age workers in the recent decade by 
eliminating incentive for early retirement, using various strategies to stimulate work 
participation, increasing skill training and reducing compensation for part-time job as early 
retirement imposes high cost for Germany’s pension fund (see also Borsch-Supan and Schnabel, 
1998; Borsch-Supan and Schnabel, 2010). In Japan, around 34% of the total population, which is 
around 127.6 million people, is considered as old age population (above 65 years of age) in 
2004. Japan had undertaken fiscal and financial reforms concerning old age population by 
creating balance with the decrease in the number of labor force and population that lives longer 
makes replacement rate fall from 60% to a minimum ceiling at 50% of salary before retirement. 
In addition, in 2013, law and regulations were amended which required employers to gradually 
extend the retirement age to 65 years with employment scheme after retirement (International 
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Longevity Center, 2013). This policy corresponds with the recommendation by Gruber and Wise 
(2005) who used data from Japan and 11 OECD countries. They found that extension of 
retirement age by 3 years will help in reducing government expenditure regarding welfare by 
27% of total expenditure or around 0.72% of GDP, depending on the adjustment of welfare in 
accordance with the actuarial calculation. 
 There are many reasons as to why old people exit labor market; for instance, belief that 
productivity has fallen with age, relationship between employer and employee, environment and 
working conditions (Myck, 2015). In many countries, old workers often have the feeling that 
they are unwanted in an organization, which makes them work from day to day (Meadows, 
2003). This leads to involuntary resignation and for those who still want to continue working but 
face unemployment situation owing to work redundancy, they are forced to resign and work 
independently without other alternative (Block and Koellinger, 2009). The need to work 
independently is partly due to age discrimination and inflexible labor legislatives as employers 
do not want to risk hiring old workers with additional expenditure on employee welfare (Adams, 
2004; Lahey, 2006). In many countries, there have been pressures to support employment 
scheme with work nature that is more suitable for old workers (Eurofound, 2012). Many studies 
such as Hellerstein et al. (1999), Mahlberg et al. (2013) Borsch-Supan and Weiss (2013) and 
Zwick and Gobel (2013) have shown some empirical evidence that old age does not always bring 
about lower productivity.  
 From an overview of literature in Thailand, many useful policy recommendations for 
ageing society have been made and are in line with those abroad. Majority of Thai society agree 
with the recommendations. However, there still lacks a research that explicitly presents 
government “demo” policies and the empirical analysis of the impact which is anticipated to 
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occur as a result of the policies discussed. Such research has to also show the link between the 
measures implemented and the eventual impacts on the economy in general. Along this line, this 
article tries to fill the research gap between both groups of literature discussed by implementing 
two demo tools namely; labor laws and tax incentive, in order to create an employment scheme 
that is suitable for old workers that is in line with the objective that other research papers in the 
past have aimed at but have not yet exhibited the impact empirically. 
4. Conceptual framework, methodology and scope of this research 
In this simulated study, old age labor force implies workers aged 60-79 years while 
working age labor force implies workers aged 15-59 years. Figure 1 shows the conceptual 
framework and the relational framework between different elements in the simulation, consisting 
of participation rate (
t ) of the potential elderly labor force which is stimulated by the “demo” 
measure (with
t being the ratio of productivity of old age labor compared to that of working age 
labor and 
tL2  being population aged 60-79 years that can work), economic growth ( tY ), 
difference between income and expenditure for old age (
t ), net marginal tax revenue accrued 
to the government due to increase in consumption and (in simulation 2) tax incentive for 
employers (
tTR ). In the end, we have the impact on the welfare of elderly and society in 
general under sustainable fiscal condition, which is the ultimate goal of various policies.     
 
Figure 1. Relational framework of different elements in the simulation    
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Source: Author’s illustration 
 
 The conceptual framework is based on the idea of Neoclassical Growth Model using 
Solow growth model with Cobb-Douglas production function as seen in Equation (1), which is 
appropriate for our analysis of the impact on economic growth due to changes in factors of 
production such as changes in capital goods or in the number of labor force for our preliminary 
analysis in the short run (Solow, 1956). Nonetheless, to consider other dynamics in the long run, 
the analysis should use Endogenous growth model which is appropriate when one wants to 
analyze the impact on economic growth as a result of changes in total factor productivity (TFP). 
Such analysis seeks to examine relationship between factors of production and TFP, which 
determines productivity per head in the long run. However, the scope of this article does not 
include TFP in our estimation but can be extended in the future. 
    121 )( ttttt LLKAY    (1) 
With  ttt sYKdK  )1(1  
tY  is country’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
 tA is technology 
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tK is level of capital 
 
tL1 is economically active persons (EAP) which is defined as the number of population 
aged 15-59 years in labor market 
 
tL2 is the number of potential population aged 60-79 years, excluding disabled and 
patients requiring long-term care 
  is ratio of productivity of 
tL2 to that of tL1 as a result of different workloads 
  is participation rate in labor market by
tL2  
 d is depreciation of capital 
 s is saving 
In the simulation, technological growth rate is set at 3.3% with 352.0  as in 
Pholphirul (2005) and 06.0d  as in Bosworth (2005). The estimation period is 2014-2040 with 
macroeconomic variables and the initial value of K set equal to the actual data provided by 
NESDB in 2014. Change in the demographic structure depends on the latest population estimate 
by NESDB in 2010. At glance, the result of evaluation of economic growth according to the 
model in equation (1) based on the unique characteristics of Thai labor market by adapting the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Rapid Assessment Protocal (RAP) (Schmitt, 2011) is 
compared with the estimation of economic growth by IMF (2015) and TDRI in the case of 
moderate economic growth in Prasitsiriphon et al. (2013), in order to consider the 
appropriateness of the model in this research (See Figure 3). It can be said that the estimated 
result from the economic growth model in this research is consistent, with projected value lying 
in between the estimates forecasted by these two organizations and hence is acceptable for the 
purpose of our analysis. 
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Figure 2. Estimates of economic growth (Currency: Baht) 
     
Source: IMF (2015), Prasitsiriphon et al. (2013) and calculation by the author. 
 
The evaluation in the model aims to exhibit empirical impact on the country’s GDP, 
additional income to the elderly, and the government’s fiscal condition by comparing with the 
baseline scenario, which is the case where Thailand is transiting to an ageing society without any 
additional measures. This paper sets all old age welfare initiatives that are being currently 
provided by the government constant. In this regard, we examine whether we can encourage 
those who can still work6 in 60-79 age group (
tL2 ), or the potential elderly labor force, to 
participate more in the market (which implies a rise in  ) with different stimulus packages by the 
government depending on the scenario of the simulation. The detail of simulation scenarios is as 
follow: 
Simulation 1: Old age welfare provided by the government is set equal to the present 
package irrespective of whether a person is employed or not. Adjustment with labor legislatives 
                                                 
6 Potential elderly labor force excludes disabled and patients in need of long-term care based on Prasitsirphon et al. 
(2013). 
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for employers is made to create more flexibility by reducing obligation regarding welfare for old 
age workers under the condition that the workload for old age workers must be lower than those 
in the working age. In this simulation, the maximum workload for old age workers is set at 3 
working days per week, which has been calculated from the desired work hours for old age 
workers ranging between 7-21 hours per week (meaning that if one works for 7-8 hours per day, 
one has to work for 2-3 days per week) as in Bell and Rutherford (2013). The objective of this is 
to give elders, who decide to continue working, an old age life with flexibility while giving them 
social space in the organization with better physical and mental health. 
Simulation 2: The labor legislatives are same as in Simulation 1. In addition, tax 
incentive for employers who hire old age workers is in place. In this research, employers can use 
additional expenditure incurred on hiring old age workers in deducting tax at the additional cost 
reduction of 50% for taxable corporate profit calculation7. For instance, before tax incentive is in 
place, employers can deduct expenditure incurred on hiring by 1 time. When the aforementioned 
tax incentive is in place, tax deduction from expenditure incurred on hiring the elderly is by 1.5 
times.    
Consequently, as GDP changes according to the estimation of each period, the model 
evaluates the impact on the average income of the elderly ( tLw 2 ). In the case that labor market 
functions effectively, marginal productivity of labor (MPL) is reflected in the wage rate for labor 
as in equation (2). Thus, wage rate for the elderly should follow equation (3). 




)(
)1(
212 tt
tt
t
t
LL
KA
L
Y





      (2) 
                                                 
7 Owing to the fact that the recommendation has not been explicitly implemented in any country, future research can 
analyze for the optimal cost reduction rate to further the literature in this topic. Nonetheless, the rate of 50% as used 
in this study is a mere “demo” to depict a concrete scenario.  
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Subsistence level for old age labor can be shown as the difference between income and 
expenditure as in equation (4). 
ttt EB           (4) 
 With 
 t = difference between all income and expenditure on average 
tE  = all expenditures on average 
  ),,,(),(, 22 ttLttttt LwrfB  , which is all incomes on average 
 t  = pension and other old age allowances  
 t = interest from investment or savings before retirement 
 tr = interest rate 
 t = income after retirement (for any income earned from work) 
 If t , t and tE  are kept constant, equation (4) implies that 0


t
t

 and if 0 for 
majority of the elderly, they are said to be “beyond” subsistence level (See Figure 1). 
 From the government’s point of view, there will be marginal tax revenue from an 
increase in GDP. People’s income increases as 0


t
t

, which caused more tax to be levied on 
marginal consumption. Following this, value-added tax (VAT) follow equation (5). 
  VATtVAT tsYfTR ),1(,       (5) 
 where 
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 VATTR  = Value Added Tax revenue 
 tY  = GDP 
 s  = saving rate 
 VATt  = VAT rate 
and 0
















t
t
VAT Y
Y
TR
. In Simulation 2, where tax incentive for employers hiring old age 
workers is implemented (additional cost reduction for taxable corporate profit calculation, t ), 
the tax revenue from corporate tax (CT) should follow equation (6). 
 tCTtCT tYfTR ,,       (6) 
With 
CTTR = revenue from corporate tax 
CTt  = rate for corporate tax 
 t  = additional cost reduction for taxable corporate profit calculation 
 From equation (6), it can be found that 0


t
CT
Y
TR
and 0


t
CTTR

in practice. 
Government revenue from corporate tax tends to be positive8 because marginal revenue from 
corporate profit as a result of economic growth 
t
CT
Y
TR


 is more likely to be larger than revenue 
foregone from allowing business enterprises more cost reduction (only for the cost of hiring old 
age workers) 
t
CTTR


which is smaller than other costs in conducting business. Hence, net tax 
                                                 
8 However, this figure can be negative in theory as well depending on the rate at which cost reduction for taxable 
corporate profit calculation is set.  
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revenue 

TR
in the simulation is limited to the outcome of marginal revenue from VAT and the 
revenue lost from allowing more cost reduction for corporate tax (See equation 7), which is the 
“potential minimum marginal tax revenue”. This implies the possibility that net marginal tax 
revenue can be larger than this minimum threshold. 
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VAT TRY
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     (7) 
5. The results of simulated scenarios 
 Statistical synthesis by the National Statistical office in section 2 reported 2,509,444 old 
age workers or around 35.74% of the total potential old age population in Thailand. This statistic 
is in accordance with cross-check calculation. This is done by taking the number of total elderly 
estimated by NESDB and deducting the number of disabled and patients requiring long-term 
care from Prasitsiriphon et al. (2013) which eventually yields the number of potential elderly 
labor force. If we calculate the number of elderly workers (which is around 2.5 million according 
to the National Statistical office) as a ratio of potential elderly labor force, the figure comes to 
around 32% which implies that there are around 32-35% of potential elderly labor force who are 
working in the economic system but bear the same workload as labor force aged 15- 59 years. If 
the government can support the elderly labor force who are already in the market to continue 
working and promote the other 65% of elderly labor force who lack the opportunity or incentive 
to participate in the market, the government can increase the number of labor force to the fullest.   
      In the simulation, the elderly still receive basic old age welfare according to what the 
government is currently giving irrespective of employment status. The structure of labor law is 
adjusted, reducing the burden regarding welfare benefits for old age workers under the condition 
that workload of elderly workers must be lower than those in working age. Moreover, the 
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maximum workload for the elderly is set at 3 days per week while working age person work for 
5 days per week on average. Hence, in calculating productivity, it is assumed that 1 elderly 
person is equivalent to 3/5 of working age person. Figure 3 shows the number of potential labor 
force which varies according to the rate at which elderly workers participate in the labor market. 
Figure 4 shows the additional number of potential labor force that varies according to the rate at 
which elderly workers participate in the labor market. 
Figure 3. Estimated number of elderly labor force, which varies according to the participation 
rate (
t ) in the labor market (Unit: number of working age labor force equivalent to 1 elderly 
labor) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated number of additional potential labor force, which varies according to the 
participation rate of elderly labor force (Unit: Percentage) 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Table 6 shows the impact on GDP as a result of an increase in the number of elderly 
population in the demographic structure compared with the baseline case where working 
population is constant. It should be noted that if no measure is undertaken to stimulate elderly 
labor force to participate in the market, the growth of elderly population will drag down the rate 
of economic growth. Nonetheless, if measures are undertaken to increase participation rate 
among the elderly labor force, economic growth will be boosted when compared with the 
baseline case where participation in the market is not stimulated. From Table 7, it can be noted 
that if, at least, 50% of potential elderly labor force participate in the labor market, GDP can 
increase by around 4.74-9.35% from the present case where no elderly labor force is employed. 
Table 6. Estimated impact of ageing society on GDP, compared to the baseline case with 
working population constant at 2014.  
  2015 2020 2525 2030 2035 2040 
Impact of ageing 
society -0.32% -2.28% -4.97% -7.95% -10.19% -11.78% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 7. Estimated increase in the growth of GDP from that of the baseline case where elderly 
labor force is not employed, according to variation in participation rate among elderly labor 
force. 
  2015 2020 2525 2030 2035 2040 
DGDP, gamma = 0.50 4.73% 5.88% 7.30% 8.83% 9.91% 10.63% 
DGDP, gamma = 0.75 7.05% 8.75% 10.85% 13.11% 14.68% 15.74% 
DGDP, gamma = 1.00 9.35% 11.58% 14.34% 17.30% 19.35% 20.73% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
As for the marginal income for elderly labor force (See Figure 5), if one participates in the labor 
market, one can earn additional income of 44,268 Baht per person per annum (in the case of 
minimum wage rate at 300 Baht adjusted according to 3/5 workload of working age person) to 
165,294.74 Baht per person per annum (calculated according to equation (3) in the case of 
perfect market) or around 3,689-13,775 Baht per person per month.  In the year 2040, additional 
income adjusted with inflation will be around 44,496-555,632.77 Baht per person per annum or 
around 3,708-44,061 Baht per person per month, which varies according to one’s ability and 
knowledge. This amount is an additional income after retirement, which can uplift the standard 
of living for the elderly above subsistence level as seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 5. Estimated additional average income for elderly labor force who participate in the labor 
market (Unit: Baht per person per annum) 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
   
 In Simulation 1, the increase in GDP growth as a result of stimulating participation in 
labor market among elderly labor force, coupled with an increase in the marginal income of 
elderly labor force cause consumption to increase. Fixing revenue from other taxes constant and 
VAT rate at 7%, revenue from VAT is estimated to increase significantly. Figure 6 shows 
marginal tax revenue which varies according to the participation rate among elderly labor force 
in the economy. Table 8 shows an increase from the estimated tax revenue in the case of upward 
adjustment of the past rates as in Thailand’s Budget in Brief (Bureau of the Budget, 2004-2014). 
If the government can encourage at least 50% of the potential elderly labor force to participate in 
the market, it will be able to generate marginal VAT revenue around 33,279 - 66,994 million 
Baht in the present and around 206,294 - 402,326 million Baht in 2040, which implies that 
marginal VAT revenue increases by about 1.38 – 2.73% from the estimated tax revenue in the 
present baseline case where no aforementioned incentive is implemented and around 1.57 – 
3.06% in 2040. 
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Figure 6. Estimated marginal VAT revenue which varies according to the participation rate 
among elderly labor force (Unit: Baht) 
 
Source: Estimated by Author with baseline case data from Thailand’s Budget in Brief (2004-
2014), Bureau of the Budget. 
 
Table 8. Estimated increase in marginal VAT revenue from that of the baseline case where 
participation rate among elderly labor force is not stimulated, which varies according to the 
participation rate among elderly labor force 
  2015 2020 2525 2030 2035 2040 
gamma = 0.50 1.38% 1.51% 1.64% 1.73% 1.68% 1.57% 
gamma = 0.75 2.06% 2.25% 2.44% 2.56% 2.49% 2.33% 
gamma = 1.00 2.73% 2.98% 3.23% 3.38% 3.29% 3.06% 
Source: Estimated by Author with baseline case data from Thailand’s Budget in Brief (2004-
2014), Bureau of the Budget. 
In Simulation 2, labor legislative is assumed to be the same as in Simulation 1, which is 
reinforced with tax incentive for employers who hire elderly labor force. This research assumes 
that employers can submit expenses incurred on hiring elderly workers as tax rebate at the 
additional rate of 50%9 cost reduction for taxable corporate profit calculation. For instance, 
before this tax incentive is implemented, employers deduct expenses incurred on hiring by 1 time 
but when the incentive scheme is implemented, employers can use the expenditure incurred on 
hiring elderly workers as rebate by 1.5 times. Tax rate which is used for the calculation is the 
                                                 
9 As explained in 7. 
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effective tax rate (ETR) as employed in Phijaisanit (2011b). From the simulation, it is found that 
the aforementioned measure partly causes the increase in the marginal revenue from corporate 
tax to be negative10 (See Figure 7). However, after considering the net tax revenue from Figure 6 
and 7 (as shown in Figure 8), net marginal revenue from both taxes is still positive, which is 
around 18,061 – 35,322 million Baht in the present and around 177,863 – 345,463 million Baht 
in 2040.This increase in the marginal tax will eventually lead to a minimum increase in 
government revenue by around 0.75 – 1.46% in the present and 1.35 – 2.63% in 2040, when 
compared to the estimated tax revenue in the case of no stimulus measure (See Table 10). The 
government can use this marginal revenue to support budget for old age welfare, which accounts 
for around 4,000 Baht per person per annum on average in the present. This estimated figure for 
the year 2040 is around 22,000 Baht per person per annum on average (See Table 11). This 
amount of money is likely to play a role in uplifting the quality of life for the elderly, which also 
have other external impacts discussed in the literature review in section 2 and 3 such as good 
physical and mental health. And at the same time, the aforementioned mechanism will strengthen 
the financial and fiscal system which will further sustain the economic system. Nevertheless, this 
estimation has not included other governmental expenditures that will come along with the 
growth of the economy. Hence, it should be noted that this is only a potential “minimum” 
marginal tax revenue gain which fulfills the goal of this research; an endeavor to pioneer an 
integrated analysis to exhibit the impact empirically. In other words, if we look at the overall 
system, incentive measures to stimulate the elderly labor force to participate in the labor market 
is a self-funded model which is fiscally sustainable- a win-win scenario for all. 
                                                 
10 Only for the calculation of minimum marginal tax revenue in this study. Please see explanations in Equation (6) 
and (7). 
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Figure 7. Estimated marginal revenue from corporate tax (excluding marginal revenue from 
increased corporate profit), which varies according to participation rate of elderly labor force in 
the market. (Unit: Baht) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation   
 
Figure 8 Estimated minimum potential marginal tax revenue (VAT and corporate tax), which 
varies according to participation rate of the elderly labor force in the market. (Unit: Baht) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
Table 10. Estimated rate of increase in the minimum marginal tax revenue from that of the 
baseline case where no measure to stimulate the elderly labor force to participate in the market is 
implemented, according to variation in participation rate 
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  2015 2020 2525 2030 2035 2040 
gamma = 0.50 0.75% 0.96% 1.17% 1.34% 1.39% 1.35% 
gamma = 0.75 1.11% 1.42% 1.73% 1.98% 2.05% 2.00% 
gamma = 1.00 1.46% 1.87% 2.28% 2.60% 2.69% 2.63% 
   Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Table 11. Estimated average net marginal revenue per elderly labor force that enters the market. 
  2015 2020 2525 2030 2035 2040 
gamma = 0.50 4,530.80 6,654.88 9,428.98 12,951.89 17,383.09 23,090.25 
gamma = 0.75 4,479.84 6,576.57 9,308.10 12,770.20 17,128.91 22,746.75 
gamma = 1.00 4,430.41 6,501.12 9,192.55 12,597.96 16,889.28 22,424.09 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
6. Conclusions and further research implications 
 This research employs 2 “demo” policy tools for consideration; labor legislatives and tax 
incentive with the aim of creating a more flexible employment structure with more alternatives 
for elderly labor force in accordance with the policy that other papers in the literature have tried 
to propose but have not shown the impact empirically through simulated scenarios. If there is no 
measure to stimulate the elderly labor force to participate in the market, the impact of ageing 
society will deteriorate economic growth. In Simulation 1, with old age employment incentives, 
economic growth will be boosted when compared with that of the baseline case where there is no 
stimulus measure. If participation rate among the potential elderly labor force is raised by a 
minimum of 50%, GDP will grow at the rate of 4.74 – 9.35% compared with that of the baseline 
case. Regarding marginal income for the elderly participation in the market, an average marginal 
income of approximately 44,268 Baht to 165,294.74 Baht per person per annum or around 3,689 
– 13,775 Baht per person per month can be earned at present, depending on one’s ability and 
knowledge. This amount of marginal income can be used to support income after retirement. 
With regards to the tax revenue for the government as a result of economic growth, combined 
with an increase in income among elderly workers, overall consumption is expected rise. Under 
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the assumption that revenue from other taxes and 7% VAT rate fixed, if the stimulus measure is 
able to induce participation in the market by a minimum of 50% of the potential elderly labor 
force, marginal tax revenue for government will increase around 33,279 – 65,994 million Baht, 
which implies that marginal tax revenue increases by around 1.38 – 2.73% compared with that of 
the baseline scenario without any stimulus. 
 In Simulation 2, tax incentive for employers is implemented, which allows cost deduction 
using expenditures incurred on hiring elderly workers by 1.5 times in taxable corporate profit 
calculation. With implementation of this incentive scheme, minimum marginal revenue from 
both taxes (VAT and corporate tax) will be around 18,061 – 35,322 million Baht. This marginal 
tax revenue will increase the government revenue by a minimum of 0.75 – 1.46% when 
compared with that in the baseline scenario where no stimulus measure is implemented. The 
government can use this tax revenue in supporting expenditure related to basic old age welfare, 
which accounts for around an average minimum of 4,000 Baht per person per annum. 
 It can be preliminarily implied that the by implementing the “demo” stimulus measures 
proposed in this article, the marginal income earned the additional welfare benefits funded by the 
marginal tax revenue will play a significant role in the improvement of the quality of the elderly 
life. In addition, there can be other positive externalities generated from working at old age; for 
instance, good physical and mental well-being. Concerning fiscal sustainability, the simulated 
scenarios show that the aforementioned mechanism will strengthen the financial and fiscal 
system. It is to be noted that the government revenue in this study only reflects the potential 
“minimum” marginal tax revenue gain. This implies that it is possible for marginal revenue to be 
higher, taking other taxes into account in the future. Some examples for future research avenues 
include general equilibrium analysis for the policy discussed in this paper, sectoral analyses, 
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preparation for long-term skills required for ageing society and infrastructure for ageing society. 
Nevertheless, presenting an overview of an empirical impact of demo measures on the economy 
achieved the major objective of this research paper. It can be said in general that appropriately 
stimulating elderly participation in the labor market is healthy, self-funded and fiscally 
sustainable, which is a win-win scenario for all. However, the success of these policies depends 
on the cooperation among government organizations and the mechanism that mobilize every 
sector in the society. 
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